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in two recent federal cases,35 but denied in a third.36 It cannot be denied
that the case will involve new procedure and more latitude in prepara-
tion of the defendant's case. However, the pessimistic predictions of
doom present in the dissenting opinion of Justice Clark would appear
without foundation, since the decision, in restricting defendant's right
of examination to specific and relevant material, never afforded the
defendant a "Roman holiday." 37
LAURENCE A. COBB
Federal Jurisdiction-Enforcement of Collective Bargaining
Agreements Under Section 301 of Labor-Management
Relations Act
Much of the confusion and uncertainty as to the constitutionality and
proper application of section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),' created, at least in part, by the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. case,2 has now been somewhat
alleviated. By its decision in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,3 the Court has clearly upheld the constitutionality of section 301.
It is not so clear how the Court reconciles its extension of federal
jurisdiction with article III, section 2 of the Constitution4 which limits
"United States v. Frank, D.D.C., June 20, 1957; United States v. Hoffa,
D.D.C June 20, 1957.
"'United States v. Benson, 20 F.R.D. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
37 353 U.S. at 680-81.
161 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1953).
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act and any employer whose activities affect commerce
as defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor
organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a
labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only
against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be
enforceable against any individual member or his assets."
2348 U.S. 437 (1955).
353 U.S. 448 (1957). The case involved an action brought by a labor union
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama seeking
specific performance of the arbitration provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment The district court exercised jurisdiction and ordered the employer to comply
with the arbitration provisions. The court of appeals, in a split decision,
reversed, holding that although the district court had jurisdiction to entertain
the suit it lacked authority founded on either state or federal law to grant
the relief sought. 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956). On certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the court of appeals.
'U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority . .. .
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the national "judicial power" to those cases "arising under" the Con-
stitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Not only did the
majority of the Court find little constitutional difficulty in extending the
federal judicial power to the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments, including specific performance of arbitration provisions contained
therein, but it also directed the federal district courts to "fashion a body
of federal law" for the enforcement of such agreements.5
Justice Frankfurter, in a lone dissent, failed to find in the legislative
history of section 301 congressional intent to grant to the federal courts
the right to specifically enforce arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements. He also felt that the section could not be
constitutionally construed to grant jurisdiction to federal courts over
contracts founded on state substantive law, in the light of the provisions
of article III of the Constitution. The majority was little bothered by
the constitutional problem set forth by Justice Frankfurter. 6 As stated
by Justice Douglas:
There is no constitutional difficulty. Article 3, § 2 extends
the judicial power to cases "arising under . . . the laws of the
United States . . . ." The Power of Congress to regulate these
labor-management controversies under the Comfnerce Clause is
plain . . . . A case or controversy arising under § 301 (a) is,
therefore, one within the purview of judicial power as defined in
Article 3.7
Justices Burton and Harlan concurred in the result, but disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the substantive law to be applied
was federal law:
The power to decree specific performance of a collectively
bargained agreement to arbitrate finds its source in § 301 itself,
and in a Federal District Court's inherent equitable powers,
nurtured by a congressional policy to encourage and enforce labor
arbitration in industries affecting commerce.
8
Apparently, these two Justices viewed the case in a "remedial sense"
only, following the view of Judge Wyzanski in Textile Workers Union,
CIO v. American Thread Co.9 Justices Burton and Harlan also noted
with approval the view of Judge Magruder in International Brotherhood
bf "Teamsters, AFL v. W. L. Mead, Inc.,10 to the effect that some federal
S353 U.S. at 451.
'Id. at 469-84. Cf. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
houg Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 449-52 (1955).
353 U.S. at 457.
8 Id. at 460.
p113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).1 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956).
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rights may necessarily be involved in a section 301 case and, therefore,
the constitutionality can be upheld as a congressional grant to the federal
district courts of "protective jurisdiction." The reasoning of the con-
curring justices is probably best expressed by the dissent of Judge
Brown, in the court of appeals' determination of the principal case:
But the studied search for a federal statute, the painstaking
analysis of the cases under it [i.e., by the two-judge majority],
demonstrates, I think, a misconception of the fundamentals. It is
as though we were dealing with a court having statutory power
only. But that is not the case. The United States District Court
is a constitutional organ with the intrinsic capacity to grant tradi-
tional coercive relief as the cases over which it has jurisdiction
may require ....
The remedy sought here is common and traditional-the
equity injunction to compel or restrain action because of the
inadequacy of the usual money damage. Its availability need find
no source, as such, in specific statute."1
This reasoning would appear to be sound. But while it avoids some of
the logical difficulties presented by the majority's construction of section
301 (the "substantive law" approach), which does not seem to be
founded on any authority, it still falls to solve many of the constitu-
tional problems.' 2
It remains to be seen whether the Court has, in effect, attributed to
section 301 of Taft-Hartley an "occult content" as alleged by Justice
Frankfurter.' 3 What are the constitutional implications of the decision
in the field of federal jurisdiction, and what repercussions may be felt
in the area of labor relations?
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The courts have not been without their difficulties in construing the
language, "cases . . . arising under the laws of the United States." A
very broad scope was accorded by Chief Justice Marshall in the leading
case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,14 where the language was
held to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over suits brought by or
against the national bank chartered by Congress. It was reasoned that
the original "law" which established the bank impliedly contained, as an
"original ingredient," a federal question which would satisfy the
11230 F.2d 81, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1956).
12 It might be noted that Judge Brown also indicated his belief that § 301 might
be used in a "modified substantive way." Id. at 95.
13 353 U.S. at 461 (dissenting opinion).
1422 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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"arising under" test of article III. However, the broad construction of
the clause by Chief Justice Marshall in the Osborn case has not been
followed by the courts in most subsequent cases which have arisen
under either the Constitution or the federal jurisdiction statute.1
While the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases16 followed the rationale of
Osborn, such cases as Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,1 7 and Gully v. First
Nat'l Bank,18 while recognizing the validity of the charter cases (such
as Osborn) within their special field, treated them as exceptional and
refused to extend their doctrine: "Today, even more clearly than in the
past, 'the federal nature of the right to be established is decisive-not
the source of the authority to establish it.' "19
The importance of raising a "federal question" in the plaintiff's
complaint in order to establish the jurisdiction of the court is well-
illustrated by such cases as Bell v. Hood,20 and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co. :_ "The plaintiff's claim itself must present a federal
question 'unaided by anything alleged in anticipation of avoidance of
defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.' "22 How-
ever, as illustrated by McGoon .v. Northern Pac. Ry.,2 a case may not
properly be brought within the "arising under" clause unless its de-
termination actually and substantially involves a dispute over a federal
law.24
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills would seem to represent a
radical departure from the traditional requisites for the exercise of
jurisdiction by a federal district court under article III. Here, there is
no federally created right to be vindicated, the substantive law being
state, not federal. Yet, Congress is permitted to create federal juris-
diction to the satisfaction of the "federal question" clause of article III
where there is no substantive federal law in existence to be construed
15 Congress also utilized the "arising under" language in a statute which pro-
vided for a general grant of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1953).
1- 115 U.S. 1 (1885).7 288 U.S. 476 (1933).
's299 U.S. 109 (1936).1 Id. at 114, citing Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933). The
scope of the Osborn decision is further curtailed by statute. Federal incorporation
may not now serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction except where the United States
holds more than one-half of the corporation's stock. 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1953).327 U.S. 678 (1946).
21339 U.S. 667 (1950).
I22 d. at 672.
23204 Fed. 998, 1002-03 (D.N.D. 1913). Here, a suit brought by a shipper
against a railroad company to recover for damage to property incurred while being
transported in interstate commerce was held to arise under the Interstate Commerce
Act and to involve a construction of that law for purposes of conferring federar
jurisdiction under the "arising under" clause. Cf. Doucette v. Vincente, 194 F.2cr
834, 845 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Annots., 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 n. 35 (1949).
"' Of course, any national source will suffice whether the particular case "arises
under" the Constitution, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), a federal law, Bock v.
Perkins, 130 U.S. 628 (1891), or a treaty, Wilson Cypress Co. v. Del Pozo y
Marcos, 236 U.S. 635 (1915).
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or enforced.25 The reference by the Court to the commerce clause and
the impossibility of basing the decision on any other portion of article
III would seem to leave little else to support the finding of jurisdiction
but the "federal question" clause. On what grounds is the Court justified
in finding this case to "arise under" a law of the United States? The
majority chose not to rationalize publicly its decision, simply relying on
the bald reference to the commerce clause. 26
The Osborn case might be thought analogous, but there, incorpora-
tion by an act of Congress supplied the "original federal ingredient" by
which the resulting jurisdiction could be rationalized by the Chief
Justice who, undoubtedly, "leaned over backward" to protect the bank
from local prejudices. 27  It can hardly be said that a labor union,
or a collective bargaining agreement, founded on no federal law, similarly
satisfies the "original ingredient" rule. Yet, Osborn demonstrates that
situations might develop where Congress may use the federal courts as
a means for protecting a special interest within the "arising under"
clause of article III. The use of the federal courts for "protective"
purposes is further illustrated by the provisions for jurisdiction under
article III, section 2, which follow after the "arising under" clause and
which create independent jurisdictional grounds not dependent on
federal substantive law. 28
The present case raises the question of how far Congress may go in
protecting a special interest through the use of the federal "sanctuary."
In determining what interests may be so protected, the theory has been.
advanced that any interest over which Congress has the power to legislate
may qualify. 29
From this point of view, each such interest is necessarily one
which the Constitution has determined to be a potential subject of
national concern; since Congress might act in behalf of such
interests in some substantive respect, it might choose instead to
provide them with a protective forum for all their litigation.
Under this approach, so long as the interest involved is of the
21 While Congress mght have provided the substantive law to govern collective
bargaining agreements, under § 301 of Taft-Hartley, it has not chosen to do so.
"8 353 U.S. at 457.
27 See, Shulman and Jaegerman, Some Jitrisdictional Limitati ns on Federal
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 393, 404-05 (1936).
"a U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. "The judicial Power shall extend .. . to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ;---to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;-to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States ;--between a
State and Citizens of another State :-between Citizens of different States ;-be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects."
2 Mishkin, The Federal Question it; the District Courts, 53 CoLrm. L. REV. 157,
188 (1953).
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kind described, it is,of no concern whether the particular case be
one as to which CQngress might have enacted the substantive
rule.30
Another theory3 ' would permit the extension of the federal judicial
power to all cases in which Congress has the potential authority to make
rules governing the matter in controversy, but has left the state sub-
stantive law to govern, while vesting jurisdiction to enforce the law
in the federal courts. The grant of jurisdiction is here treated as an
assertion of Congress's regulatory powers.3 2  However, since the ma-
jority of justices in the principal case side-stepped state substantive law,
of the two theories noted above, the former would seem to be closer to
that followed in the Court's "holding."
Looking at the situation more realistically, it might well be concluded
that article III is not the exclusive source on which the Court bases the
grant of judicial power to the federal district courts, but that the
legislative authority of Congress under article I of the Constitution is of
equal importance. Perhaps, it is the over-all legislative power under
article I which provides the real source of (and limitation on) federal
jurisdiction, and article III is of only incidental significance. At least,
this would seem to be the effect of the present decision.
Such reasoning has received previous support in National Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co. 33  Justices Jackson, Black and Burton
there reasoned that while jurisdiction could not be sustained directly
-under article III, relying on the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in
Hepburn and Dundas v. Ellzey,3 4 it could be sustained as an exercise
of Congress's article I power of "exclusive legislation" over the District
of Columbia, i.e., citizens of the District are proper subjects to be
accorded a protective federal forum by Congress. The remaining six
justices opposed the article I approach, maintaining that article III
was the exclusive source of federal jurisdiction. A fear was expressed
that under the article I approach the district courts might be swamped
with a flood of all types of .litigation.3 5 However, Justice Rutledge,
30 Ibid.
" See, Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code,
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 216, 224-25 (1948).
"The reasoning of Justices Burton and Harlan would seem to approximate
this theory. 353 U.S. at 459-60.
33 337 U.S. 582 (1949). The question involved was the validity of a congres-
sional act which sought to open all of the federal district courts to suits between
citizens of the District of Columbia and those of the states.
" 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804). The Court, through Chief Justice Marshall
here held that the District of Columbia was not a "state" for purposes of federaljurisdiction based on the "diversity of citizenship" clause of article III.
" "If Article III were no longer to serve as the criterion of district courtjurisdiction, I should be at a loss to understand what tasks within the constitutional
-competence of Congress, might not be assigned to district courts. 337 U.S. at 616
(concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge).
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joined by Justice Murphy, concurred in the result reached by Justices
Jackson, Black and Burton, but on the precise ground opposed by the
latter-a rejection of Marshall's construction of the status of the
District of Columbia. Rutledge and Murphy felt that for purposes of the
diversity clause, the District could well be treated as a "state." 36
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, it would seem that the
majority of the Court proceeded (either consciously or unconsciously)
along lines similar to those laid down by Justices Jackson, Black and
Burton in the National Mutual Insurance case. Thus, Congress has
enacted legislation governing the field of labor relations, and in section
301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, has utilized the federal courts to effectuate
its policies. While there may be no federal substantive law which can
be applied to particular cases, and, therefore, no "federal question"
raised in the technical sense, the majority apparently felt that over-all
national policies in the area of labor relations could better be protected
in the federal courts. In effect, we have a somewhat analogous situation
to that of the "original ingredient" in Osborn. There, the incorporation
act was deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Here, the federal
legislation in the area of labor relations is, in itself, considered a sufficient
"original ingredient" to support the exercise, by the federal courts, of
a "protective jurisdiction" in support of congressional policy. Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills would seem to have resulted in a
blending of article I and article III in the area of federal jurisdiction.
While article III cannot here be considered as the original source of
judicial power, by implication it refers over to the legislative powers
granted to Congress by article I. So, in an oblique manner, the "arising
under" clause of article III may be said to have been satisfied.
The net result of Lincoln Mills, if the Court ultimately adheres to
such a theory as expressed above, could well result in the creation of
new areas of federal jurisdiction whenever Congress should see fit to
exercise its constitutional powers under article I by enacting legislation
to protect a special interest, and providing for "protection" of such an
interest in the federal courts.
LABOR LAW
The decision of the Supreme Court in the principal case results in
federal district courts' being permitted to order specific performance of
agreements to arbitrate contained in collective bargaining contracts, and
it settles the question of the constitutionality of section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act. But far from settled are various questions involving the
relationship between state and federal law in the area of labor relations,
30 "And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result-para-
doxical as it may appear-which differing majorities of the Court find insup-
portable." 337 U.S. at 655 (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter).
1958]
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and the further types of relief which might now be sought under section
301. When all the "returns are counted" it is quite possible that labor's
apparent "victory" in the Lincoln Mills case will turn out to be Pyrrhic.
The potential conflict of state and federal law posed by the Court's
decision is noted by Justice Frankfurter.3 7 While section 301 provides
the opportunity to bring a suit on breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment in the federal courts, it does not preclude the maintenance of a
similar action in the state courts. Unless state courts are prepared to
follow the substantive law which the federal courts may "fashion" in
this area,3 8 considerable conflict could result between the decisions.
Difficulties might also be presented in the establishment of a uniform
federal substantive law. If independent federal district courts may
resort to state law where it is compatible with the purposes of section
301 "in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal
policy,"39 varying conceptions of the "federal policy" by different district
court judges in particular cases might well keep the circuit courts and
the Supreme Court very busy in trying to establish a uniform law. The
Court stated that, "Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as
federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights. '40
But this "absorbing process" does not, in itself, resolve the problem of
the application of conflicting state laws by district court judges who,
in turn, may well have conflicting views of the "federal policy."
The greatest question left unsettled by Lincoln Mills is the extent to
which the federal district court may exercise its remedial powers in
enforcing collective bargaining agreements. In the principal case
specific performance was granted of an agreement to arbitrate. The
Court reasoned that, "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. ' 41 Now if the
Court decreed specific performance of the quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike, it may be reasoned that an agreement not to strike would
similarly be enforced. Suppose a union goes out on strike in violation
of such an agreement. Further suppose that the setting for the strike
is an industrial state such as New Jersey which has a "little Norris
LaGuardia Act."'42  The harried employer desires relief and wants it
fast. Under New Jersey law, he cannot enjoin the union from breaching
"' 353 U.S. at 462; Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1955).
"s An illustration of the type of jurisdictional problem which can be raised by
a case which falls within the purview of Taft-Hartley Act provisions covering un-
fair labor practices, but also within the jurisdiction of a state court to grant
"traditional relief," is presented by J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Electrical Workers
Union, AFL, 246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
30 353 U.S. at 457. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,
367 (1943).
0 353 U.S. at 457.
I11d. at 455.
"See N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A: 15-51 to -58 (1952).
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its "no-strike agreement" if there is a genuine labor dispute involved.43
Query: can an injunction now be had in the federal district court under
section 301? It has been suggested44 that, even in light of the Lincoln
Mills decision, the Norris-LaGuardia Act45 would preclude the
federal courts from enjoining strikes arising out of genuine lbor dis-
*putes; but if Lincoln Mills is taken at face value, a different conclusion
might well be reached. As noted above, the Court collated its treatment
of the agreement to arbitrate to that of an agreement not to strike. The
line between "specific performance" and "injunction" in this area is
,certainly a fine one,46 and it would hardly seem consistent for the Court
to enforce the quid pro quo of an agreement not to strike while leaving
unenforceable the "quo pro quid." Yet, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is
said to require the Court to do just that.
In its search for legislative intent, the Court cites and relies on the
,view of the House sponsor, Congressman Hartley, in answer to a ques-
tion by Congressman Barden:
"Mr. Barden.... It is my understanding that section 302...
contemplates not only the ordinary lawsuits for damages but also
such other remedial proceedings, both legal and equitable, as might
be appropriate in the circumstances ....
" No judge may issue an injunction in any case involving or growing out
of a labor dispute, except after hearing testimony of witnesses in open court in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in op-
position thereto, if offered, and except after findings by the court of all the
following facts:
a. That unlawful acts have been committed and are likely to be continued
unless restrained;
b. That substantial and irreparable injury to plaintiff's property will follow
unless the relief is granted;
c. That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon
plaintiff by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
granting thereof;
d. That plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. N. J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 15-53
(1952).
Neither will the types of relief available under formal NLRB proceedings
generally be adequate for the employer who cannot endure the effects of a strike
which runs longer than a few days.
"The Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 HARV. L. Rtxv. 83, 178, 176 n. 511 (1957).
" 46 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1953). Section 104 provides: "No
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor
dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute
(as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any
of the following acts:
"(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation
of employment;
"(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence ... "
"6,A court might "enjoin" a strike by ordering the union to "specifically per-
form" the terms of its collective bargaining agreement (including a no-strike clause
contained therein).
1958]
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"Mr. Hartley. The interpretation the gentleman has just given
of that section is absolutely correct. '47
While the Court was able to avoid the "obstacle" of the Norris-La-
Guardia* Act in the present case-"The failure to arbitrate was not a
part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." 4 8-- if
section 301 does, in effect, contemplate "stch other remedial proceedings,
both legal and equitable," should Norris-LaGuardia constitute a bar to
the issuance of an injunction to prevent a strike in breach of a non-
strike agreement? It seems unrealistic to view the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, passed in 1932, as a vital part of federal policy governing collective-
bargaining agreements (and upon which federal substantive law is now
supposed to be fashioned), where such act conflicts with the Taft-
Hartley Act, passed fifteen years later. If congressional intent is con-
strued as calling for application of all equitable remedies of the federal
courts under section 301, and Norris-LaGuardia is in irreconcilable con-
flict with the intent, the conflict, seemingly, should be resolved in favor
of the more recent legislation.49 In any event, in the hypothetical New
Jersey situation set forth above, until the Supreme Court rules on the
matter, an attorney for the "harried employer" should certainly give
serious consideration to the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief in
the federal district court under section 301.50 Meanwhile, the influence
of section 301 is undoubtedly being felt in the area of labor relations in
settlement of controversies without the necessity of court proceedings.
By its very presence and potential use as a weapon for the attainment of
not only money damages, but also injunctive-type relief in the federal
courts, section 301 should serve to accomplish some of the ends sought
by its designers-primarily, the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements.
The Supreme Court has, in Lincoln Mills, resolved one point of
controversy in the field of labor law. By its failure to spell out with
'1 353 U.S. at 455-56, quoting from 93 CONG. REc 3656-57 (1947).
'
8 Id. at 458.
judge Magruder, in W. L. Mead Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL, 217 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1954), presents a vigorous argument in support of
a contrary conclusion: Cf. Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, CIO,
167 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948), in which a union was unsuccessful in attempting to
overcome the Norris-LaGuardia obstacle in an action brought to enjoin the
employer from refusing to bargain collectively. However, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act need not necessarily prohibit a federal district court from issuing a mandatory
injunction in all cases involving a "labor dispute." "It is inaccurate to say that
the court is barred from issuing an injunction in any case involving a labor dispute."
Textile Workers Union, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626, 629 (M.D.N.C.
1950), citing the opinion of Judge Parker in Virginian Ry. v. System Federation
No. 40, 84 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1936), aff'd, 300 U.S. 515, 562-63 (1937).
'0The Norris-LaGuardia problem might also arise in situations where the
employer sues in a state court such as in North Carolina which has no "little
Norris-LaGuardia Act," and the union seeks removal to the federal courts. This,
however, raises other questions beyond the scope of this Note.
[Vol. 36
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greater clarity the rationale behind its decision, it has created numerous
potential difficulties in other areas of both labor law and federal
jurisdiction.
RIcHARD P. WEITZMAN
Mortgages-Effect of Assignment without Assigning the Debt-
Formalities Necessary to Transfer the Mortgagee's Title
to the Mortgaged Property
In a recent North Carolina case,1 X, Y, and Z together held a re-
corded mortgage. X and Y made a marginal entry on the mortgage as
follows: "For value received we hereby transfer and assign the within
mortgage deed from [mortgagors] to [Z] without recourse."2 Con-
cerning this assignment, the court uttered dicta to the effect that: (1)
The assignment sufficed to transfer only the debt which the mortgage
had been given to secure, and (2) The assignment did not pass any
title to the land. Z later conveyed the mortgaged land to a third party
by warranty deed. Concerning this conveyance, the court in a dictum
stated that the grantee in the warranty deed became a mere trustee
chargeable with a duty and responsibility to both the owner of the
equity of redemption and the owner of the debt secured by the instru-
ment. The court did not elaborate on any of these dicta and it is the
purpose of this Note to examine the validity thereof.
The statement that the assignment sufficed to transfer the debt only
seems to assume that it was sufficient to transfer the debt. No authority
for that assumption was cited. It seems to be well settled in North
Carolina that an assignment of the debt draws with it the mortgage.3
But there seems to be a dearth of authority in North Carolina as to the
effect of assigning a mortgage without transferring the debt also. One
" Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 98 S.E.2d 481 (1957).
2 The plaintiff in this case claimed title through various conveyances of the
mortgaged land beginning with a deed from Z to a third party. The defendants
claimed title under a deed from the original mortgagors which was executed about
thirty years after the mortgage. The defendants contended that the land was free
from the mortgage since no one had filed an affidavit or made a marginal entry
on the mortgage showing that the debt was alive within fifteen years after due date
of the secured debt as is required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-37(5) (1950), which
accordingly creates a conclusive presumption in favor of a purchaser of the land
that the debt is satisfied. The plaintiff contended that the statute was unconstitu-
tional since it was retroactive in effect and thus impaired the obligation of the
mortgage. The court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal on the grounds that he was
not an aggrieved party since the statute concerned only the holder of the secured
debt and the plaintiff did not claim to hold the debt. The court also said the
statute was not unconstitutional since the owners of debts affected by the statute
were given one year after enactment of the statute to comply with its provisions.
Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 189 N.C. 281, 126 S.E. 745
(1925) ; Hussey v. Hill, 120 N.C. 312, 26 S.E. 919 (1897) ; Hyman v. Devereux,
63 N.C. 624 (1869). However, the court stated in the principal case that the
transfer of a note secured by a mortgage does not transfer title to the mortgaged
nroperty nor the power of sale nor the right to release the mortgage.
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